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5Foreword
The world faces no greater challenge in the 21st century than arresting the rapidly increasing 
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that cause climate change. The two largest 
producers of these gases are the United states and China. Their cooperation is essential if there 
is to be a solution to the daunting climate change challenge. if the United states and China can 
become active catalysts in bringing about a strategic transformation to a low-carbon, sustainable 
global economy, the world will take a giant step forward in combating climate change. The 
United states and China will also edge closer to energy security, protecting their environments 
and assuring greater prosperity for their citizens. equally important, they will also succeed in 
building a far more stable and cooperative foundation for U.s.-China relations as a whole. 
 in mid-2007, the Asia society assembled a group of leading experts from the worlds of 
science, business, academia, politics, and civil society with representatives from the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the environmental Defense Fund, The Brookings institution, the national 
Committee on U.s.-China Relations, and pew Center on Global Climate Change, to explore 
how the United states and China could cooperate more closely on energy and climate change. 
The result was the establishment of the initiative for U.s.-China Cooperation on energy 
and Climate, generously supported by Asia society Board Member Jon Anda. The initiative 
evolved into a partnership between the Asia society’s Center on U.s.-China Relations, under 
the leadership of Arthur Ross Director Orville schell, and pew Center on Global Climate 
Change, under the leadership of eileen Clausen. The initiative has also been fortunate to gain 
the sponsorship and assistance of the Chinese people’s institute for Foreign Affairs in Beijing. 
The goals are two-fold:
1.  to draft a “Roadmap” for leaders of the two countries to scale up sharply U.s.-China 
cooperative projects on energy and climate change. 
2.  to catalyze a major new collaboration in this key area of common interest to put sino-U.s. 
bilateral relations on a more stable basis. 
 This Report explicates both a rationale and an outline for beginning a more comprehensive 
program of U.s.-China collaboration on energy and climate change that builds on decades 
of U.s.-China cooperation on energy and environment. it calls for initial engagement at a 
presidential summit, but also outlines some of the critical project areas that should be jointly 
explored through practical collaboration by officials at other levels of government as well as 
by the private sector. each of our recommended areas of common endeavor—which include 
coal, energy efficiency, “smart” grids, and renewable energy—should be elaborated through 
the early appointment of task Forces assigned to develop a detailed plan of collaboration and 
implementation in each area. 
 Drafts of this Report were reviewed in both the United states and China by a broad array 
of specialists, all of whom share the goal of developing a collaborative plan that would be viewed 
by Chinese leaders and the new U.s. presidential administration as workable and helpful in 




A new comprehensive program for cooperation between the United states and China 
that focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus mitigating the potentially 
catastrophic effects of climate change, is both necessary and possible. indeed, as this Report 
suggests, if human beings hope to avoid the worst consequences of global climate change, the 
United states and China—respectively the world’s largest developed and developing nations, 
the two largest energy consumers, and the two largest producers of greenhouse gases—have 
no alternative but to become far more active partners in developing low-carbon economies. 
 to prevail in such a common effort, both countries will need not only bold leadership 
and a new set of national policies, but also a path-breaking cooperative agenda that can 
be sustained over the long run. The advent of a new U.s. presidential administration in 
Washington, D.C., coupled with a central leadership in Beijing that is increasingly aware of 
the destructive impact and long-term dangers of climate change, presents an unparalleled 
opportunity for this new strategic partnership.
 While the current global economic crisis could make joint action between the United 
states and China more difficult, it could also provide an unexpected impetus. if wisely 
allocated, funds invested by both governments in economic recovery can help address climate 
change while also advancing the “green technologies” and industries that will lead to a new 
wave of economic growth. 
 stronger bilateral collaboration on energy and climate change has at the same time the 
real prospect of helping to build a new, more stable, and constructive foundation under sino-
American relations, the most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century world. 
 This Report—which was produced in partnership between Asia society’s Center on 
U.s.-China Relations and pew Center on Global Climate Change, in collaboration with 
The Brookings institution, Council on Foreign Relations, national Committee on U.s.-
China Relations, and environmental Defense Fund—presents both a vision and a concrete 
Roadmap for such sino-U.s. collaboration. With input from scores of experts and other 
stakeholders from the worlds of science, business, civil society, policy, and politics in both 
China and the United states, the Report, or “Roadmap,” explores the climate and energy 
challenges facing both nations and recommends a concrete program for sustained, high-level, 
bilateral engagement and on-the-ground action. The Report and its recommendations are 
based on the following understandings:
•  That because there is overwhelming scientific consensus that human-induced climate 
change is well underway and poses grave economic and environmental risks to the world, 
the United states and China need to immediately begin acting in concert, without 
awaiting new domestic legislation or multilateral agreements, to jointly seek remedies for 
their emissions of greenhouse gases. 
•  That because climate change is largely a consequence of soaring global use of fossil fuels, 
addressing the problem will require a fundamental transformation of energy systems in 
both countries, as well as worldwide, through the development and deployment of new 
technologies and the widespread introduction of new energy sources capable of enhancing 
the diversity, reliability, independence, and “greenness” of national energy supplies. 
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the twin challenges of climate change and energy security can succeed while also 
contributing to economic recovery and laying the foundation for a prosperous, new, low-
carbon economy in each country. 
•  That a meaningful U.s.-China partnership on climate change issues can be forged on the 
basis of equity, taking into account the respective stages of development, capacities, and 
responsibilities of each country. 
•  That while enhanced U.s.-China cooperation must begin with collaboration between 
the two national governments, success will ultimately hinge on each nation’s ability to 
catalyze action and investment in the marketplace. 
•  That if fashioned carefully, closer collaboration on energy and climate can address the 
problem of climate change and enhance the economic prospects of both nations while 
conferring on neither an unfair competitive advantage. 
•  That by demonstrating global leadership and making significant new progress toward 
closer bilateral cooperation, the world’s two largest economies will help achieve 
stronger multilateral agreement and action under the United nations (Un) Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.
 The Report recommends that, as a first step in forging this new partnership, the leaders of 
the two countries should convene a leaders summit  as soon as practically possible following the 
inauguration of Barack Obama to launch a “U.s.-China partnership on energy and Climate 
Change.” This presidential summit should outline a major plan of joint-action and empower 
relevant officials in each country to take the necessary actions to ensure its implementation. 
 The Report recommends that the partnership be directed by two parallel groups. A U.s.-
China high-level council would be established to draw up overall plans for the collaboration. 
The Commission would include high-ranking environment, energy, and finance officials 
from both countries. it would meet regularly to establish and review the strategic direction 
of the new partnership as well as to discuss other issues of common concern, including those 
relating to ongoing multilateral negotiations. 
 in addition, each of the highlighted concrete priority areas proposed below would be 
guided by a second tier of bilateral task forces. These would be composed of senior government 
officials and independent experts in science, technology, business, finance, civil society, and 
policy from each country. Their responsibilities would involve establishing goals, designating 
joint-research areas, developing collaborative programs within each of the designated 
areas, organizing concrete joint projects in each area of cooperation, and overseeing the 
implementation of these projects. 
 Areas where direct collaboration is expected to yield the quickest and most substantial 
results on reducing greenhouse gas emissions have been given highest priority. They are listed 
below in shortened form, but discussed in greater detail in section iV.
priority areas of collaboration include:
•  Deploying Low-Emissions Coal Technologies.
  The likelihood that both the United states and China will continue to rely heavily 
on coal for many years to come necessitates immediate and large-scale investments in 
8the research, development, and deployment of new technologies for the capture and 
sequestration of carbon emissions from coal-fired power plants.
• Improving Energy Efficiency and Conservation.
  Both the United states and China have significant potential to lower their carbon 
emissions through low-cost, and even no-cost, energy efficiency and conservation 
measures that would have considerable impact on each country’s “carbon footprint” and 
energy security.
• Developing an Advanced Electric Grid.
  Both the United states and China rely on outdated, decentralized, and inefficient 
electrical transmission systems. Both countries could profit from research, development, 
and adoption of new “smart grid” technologies capable of enabling these systems to 
handle larger quotients of low-carbon energy from episodic, but renewable sources of 
power more cheaply and efficiently.
• Promoting Renewable Energy. 
  There is an obvious need for both countries to develop a far broader deployment of solar, 
wind, and other renewable sources of energy in order to de-carbonize their respective 
electricity systems, expand their low-carbon economies, and thereby diminish their 
carbon emissions per unit of GDp.
• Quantifying Emissions and Financing Low-Carbon Technologies.
  to help facilitate cooperation in the above areas, it will be important to continue to 
jointly address the cross-cutting issues of quantifying and projecting emissions, and 
financing technology development and deployment. 
 That our planet is now approaching a point of no return on the question of global warming 
is increasingly self-evident. Recognition of the daunting challenges that such moments pose 
can be unsettling, even paralyzing. however, with bold leadership, they can also be galvanic. 
 it is unclear as yet whether the growing awareness of our tipping point moment will 
intersect in a timely manner with the new leadership that is now assuming office in Washington 
and the increasingly well-informed central leadership in Beijing to catalyze both countries 
toward mustering the necessary clarity of vision, intellectual resources, funding, technology, 
and international cooperation. What is clear, however, is that we are in uncharted waters 
that will beg an unprecedented effort from both the world at large and the United states and 
China in particular. For whether we choose to recognize it or not, these two countries are 
both crucial in the effort to address climate change. simply put, if these two countries cannot 
find ways to bridge the long-standing divide on this issue, there will literally be no solution. 
 Fortunately, it is the firm conviction of those who have worked on this Report over the 
past year that the United states and China will both benefit from the kind of collaboration 
outlined herein. Moreover, not only would such a collaboration allow the world to take a giant 
step forward in confronting the global climate change challenge, but both the United states 
and China would indirectly stand to profit immeasurably from it. if their leaders jointly play 
their cards astutely, the two countries could find themselves in the forefront of a new green-
tech economy, and in a stronger, more strategic partnership, better able to help lead the world 
to meet other 21st century challenges. 
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I. Introduction 
Of the many issues crowding the international agenda, there is perhaps none so pressing, 
nor so quintessentially global, as the rising threat of climate change. in its causes and 
potential consequences, climate change has implications for every inhabitant of every 
nation on earth. Yet the power to mobilize an effective response rests largely with a handful 
of nations. There are two in particular without which it will not be possible to find a 
meaningful remedy. The United states and China—the world’s largest developed and 
developing nations, the two largest energy consumers, and the two largest producers of 
greenhouse gases—must be partners in any effort to avert catastrophic climate change and 
usher in a new and prosperous low-carbon global economy. 
 The advent of a new U.s. administration presents an unparalleled opportunity for 
a new strategic partnership between the United states and China that promises a more 
sustainable future for both nations and for the world.1 The United states and China should 
develop a sustained cooperative agenda as well as national policies to catalyze a new global 
strategic transformation to sustainable, low-carbon economic development. Through direct 
collaboration, the two countries can together advance key technologies and practices that 
will help to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, while also addressing their critical energy 
security needs. The current global economic crisis, far from being a deterrent, should provide 
even stronger impetus for efforts to develop a low-carbon economy generating green jobs 
and sustainable growth. At the same time, stronger bilateral collaboration on energy and 
climate can provide the leadership and momentum needed to achieve a true global climate 
accord, and build a stronger foundation for future sino-American cooperation on other 
strategic challenges facing both nations in the 21st century. 
 This Report presents both a vision and a concrete Roadmap for this new collaboration. 
With input from scores of experts, stakeholders, and policymakers from the worlds of 
science, business, civil society, policy, and politics in China and the United states, the 
Report explores the climate and energy challenges facing both nations and recommends a 
program for sustained high-level engagement and on-the-ground action. The Report and 
its recommendations are based on the following understandings:
Action is Urgent. The United states and China should start now. There is overwhelming 
scientific consensus that human-induced climate change poses grave economic and environ-
mental risks. Minimizing these risks requires that global greenhouse gas emissions, now ris-
ing at an unprecedented rate, peak as soon as possible and decline dramatically over the com-
ing decades. Accomplishing this goal will be feasible only through concerted and sustained 
action, beginning immediately. The United states and China should not await new domestic 
legislation or multilateral agreements before launching stronger collaborative efforts. 
1 For a thorough assessment of the politics and prospects of enhancing cooperation between the United States and China 
on climate change, see Kenneth Lieberthal and David Sandalow, Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation on 
Climate Change, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., January 2009.
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A Path to Energy Security. Climate change is largely a consequence of soaring global 
energy use, and addressing it requires a fundamental transformation of energy systems 
worldwide. This transformation presents an unparalleled opportunity to simultaneously 
address the urgent energy security challenges confronting the United states, China, and 
other nations by introducing new sources and technologies capable of enhancing the 
diversity, reliability, and independence of national energy supplies.
New Economic Opportunity. At a time of global economic upheaval, strong efforts 
to address the twin challenges of climate change and energy security can contribute to 
economic recovery, while laying the foundation for a prosperous new low-carbon economy. 
The near-term investments that are needed will produce substantial long-term dividends 
through sustainable growth and employment. Conversely, delaying these investments will 
risk severe economic harm and drive up the cost of minimizing the impact of climate 
change.
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. As a point of departure, an equitable 
partnership must be built on a shared understanding of respective responsibilities and 
capacities. As the world’s largest economy and largest historic greenhouse gas emitter, 
the United states must demonstrate leadership by moving swiftly to reduce its emissions 
through mandatory national legislation. Although China has now surpassed the United 
states as the world’s largest annual emitter, its cumulative and per capita emissions are much 
lower, and development and poverty reduction will remain overriding national priorities for 
the foreseeable future. having adopted a comprehensive national climate change program, 
national Climate Change program, and agreed on the need to reduce its emissions below 
“business as usual,” China must now deliver an ambitious and effective national effort.2 
Public-Private Engagement. While enhanced U.s.-China cooperation must begin with 
collaboration between the national governments, success will hinge on each nation’s ability 
to catalyze action by the private sector. technology can be advanced, financing secured, 
and critical obstacles overcome only through a combination of bold leadership, ingenuity, 
expertise, and the mustering of the resources of leading investors, financial institutions, 
and companies in both the United states and China. But governments will play a critical 
role in creating the regulatory environment for large-scale private investment in and 
commercialization of low-carbon technologies through a wide range of tools, from tax 
incentives and subsidies to regulations and research. 
2 The G5 Statement issued by Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa on the occasion of the 2008 Hokkaido 
Toyako Summit, Sapporo, July 8, 2008, says on this point: “We, on our part, are committed to undertaking nationally 
appropriate mitigation and adaptation actions which also support sustainable development. We would increase the depth 
and	range	of	these	actions	supported	and	enabled	by	financing,	technology	and	capacity-building	with	a	view	to	achiev-
ing a deviation from business-as-usual. http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2008hokkaido/2008-g5.html
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Cooperating while Competing. Fear of competitive harm has for too long stood as an 
obstacle to strong climate action. Competition can also be an engine for innovation and 
low-carbon growth. Under any scenario, companies and industries in the United states and 
China will remain vigorous economic competitors in the global marketplace. Fashioned 
carefully, closer collaboration on energy and climate can enhance the economic prospects 
of both nations while conferring on neither an unfair competitive advantage.
Bilateral Means to Multilateral Ends. Climate change requires a global response, and 
stronger bilateral cooperation between the United states and China must contribute to, 
not deter, an effective multilateral climate agreement. By demonstrating global leadership 
and achieving bilateral practical progress, two of the world’s largest economies can help all 
nations achieve fair and comprehensive agreements under the Un Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and beyond as envisioned in the Bali Action plan.
Roadmap Recommendations
 On the basis of these principles formulated from the insights and expert guidance of 
our senior Advisors and Contributors, this Report recommends that the United states and 
China undertake a major new program of enhanced collaboration on energy and climate. 
This program must provide for focused, ongoing engagement between the two leaderships, 
and must also effectively enlist key players from government, the expert community, and 
the private sector with a stake in creating a low-carbon future. This new partnership should 
include the following key elements: 
•	  Leaders Summit. strong, sustained leadership at the highest level is critical to success. As 
soon as practical following the inauguration of the new U.s. president, the leaders of the 
two countries should convene a summit to launch a new U.s.-China partnership on energy 
and Climate Change. This agreement should build on current partnerships, including the 
ten-Year energy and environment Cooperation Framework under the strategic economic 
Dialogue, established by the two countries in June 2008. to ensure sustained attention 
at the ranking-leader level, energy and climate should be established as a standing agenda 
item for all future U.s.-China summits. The partnership should proceed on two tracks: 
•	  High-Level Council. high-ranking energy, environment, finance, and foreign 
policy officials of both countries should meet regularly to establish and review 
strategic direction for the partnership and to discuss other issues of common 
concern, including those relating to ongoing multilateral negotiations. 
•	  Task Forces. in each of the priority areas proposed below, a bilateral task force should 
be established to set goals, develop programs of action, and oversee implementation. 
The task forces should include senior officials of the relevant departments and 
ministries, independent experts, and representatives of the business and financial 
communities and non-governmental organizations. 
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•  Priority Areas for U.S.-China Cooperation. Areas where direct collaboration might 
be expected to yield the strongest return in greenhouse gas emission reduction should 
be given highest priority. These areas of recommendation, which are discussed in 
greater detail in section iV, include:
•  Deploying Low-Emissions Coal Technologies. Continuing to rely heavily on 
coal, as both countries are likely to do, will necessitate large-scale investments 
in research, pilot projects, and deployment of new technologies to capture and 
sequester the resulting carbon emissions.
•  Improving Energy Efficiency and Conservation. Both the United states and 
China have significant potential for no-cost, or low-cost, energy efficiency and 
conservation improvements that offer near-term benefits to both climate and 
energy security.
•  Developing an Advanced Electric Grid. The development of efficient transmission 
systems and “smart grid” technologies will be crucial for both countries to 
transition to a secure, reliable electricity system that relies on much larger shares of 
low-carbon energy sources.
•  Promoting Renewable Energy. The broader deployment of solar, wind, and other 
renewable sources, and expanded development of renewable energy technologies, 
would help both countries decarbonize their electricity systems and expand their 
low-carbon economies.
•  Quantifying Emissions and Financing Low-Carbon Technologies. to help 
facilitate cooperation in the above areas, it will be important to continue to jointly 
address the cross-cutting issues of quantifying and projecting emissions, and 
financing technology development and deployment. 
 These recommendations are offered in the belief that stronger cooperation between 
the United states and China to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and catalyze a new low-
carbon economy is necessary, possible, and advantageous. Without setting ambitious goals, 
identifying new ways to measure progress, sustaining focus from all levels, and, when 
necessary, recalibrating efforts, neither country, nor the globe, will be able to meet the 
climate challenges ahead. 
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II. Catalyzing a Second Strategic  
Transformation
China and the United States are closely linked through a vast web of economic, politi-
cal, and security interests and social networks that have deepened and broadened through 
government-to-government collaboration and through the process of globalization. The 
result is an interdependent, bilateral relationship in a world in which the fates of all nations 
are tied ever closer together, as evidenced by the rapid internationalization of the 2008 
financial crisis. China and the United states face similar strategic challenges in seeking 
to strengthen energy security, combat climate change, and ensure economic growth and 
prosperity. however, neither can fully meet these challenges—nor can the world—without 
the full engagement of the other. 
 nearly four decades ago, a historic rapprochement between the United states and China 
set in motion the most far-reaching transformation of the international economic, political, 
and security order since the aftermath of World War ii. in opening the door to a new strate-
gic relationship in 1972, China and the United states overcame more than 20 years of mutual 
isolation, ideological rivalry, and intense hostility, inflamed by a hot war in Korea, a near-
conflict over taiwan, and a proxy war in Vietnam. The initial objective of this rapprochement 
was the containment and strategic isolation of the soviet Union, and one effect was, indeed, 
to hasten the peaceful demise of the soviet Union and its eastern european empire, thereby 
ending the Cold War and creating the conditions for a more integrated world economy. 
 The subsequent normalization of U.s.-China relations in 1979 created the interna-
tional conditions for China’s successful opening to the outside world and its market-based 
economic reforms, leading not only to the extraordinary reemergence of China on the 
global stage, but to the acceleration of globalization. Despite periodic bilateral tensions and 
differences, the U.s.-China relationship has contributed significantly to global economic 
growth and strategic stability, as well as to solving many pressing political and security 
problems. As China has grown immensely more powerful over the last thirty years, the 
United states and China have not engaged in a destabilizing strategic competition for re-
gional and global dominance. Rather, leaders in both nations have recognized their increas-
ing strategic interdependence and have effectively collaborated to solve or manage regional 
and global threats and challenges. For example, since 9/11, the two countries have cooper-
ated quietly and extensively on a wide range of counter-terrorism measures. They have also 
engaged in sustained and effective collaboration on proliferation, including the six party 
talks, to eliminate north Korea’s nuclear weapons program; establishing collaborative bi-
lateral and international measures, stimulated by the 2003 sARs epidemic and the later 
emerging danger of avian flu, to prevent and contain pandemics; and consulting at a high 
level on a daily basis in response to the fall 2008 global financial crisis. in addition, they 
have effectively handled the volatile taiwan issue, leading to more hopeful prospects for 
long-term peace and stability in cross-strait relations. 
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 in the 21st century, the United states and China now have a chance to catalyze another 
major transition in the international economic and political order—this time to help 
facilitate the emergence of a low-carbon global economy. While the european Union has 
taken the lead, and other major powers are declaring a willingness to act, they will lack 
the confidence and clout to effect a real global transformation without the participation, 
leadership, and commitment of the United states and China. The reality is that prospects 
for a comprehensive new climate agreement, whether later this year in Copenhagen or 
beyond, rest heavily on the political will of the United states and China. 
 A new U.s.-China partnership on energy and climate could also help preserve and 
strengthen sino-American relations more broadly. As the two economies have become 
increasingly intertwined, each has become mutually vulnerable to developments within the 
other, leading to frequent tensions over trade and financial issues. Against that backdrop, 
climate and energy issues have given rise to further concerns about a loss of competitiveness 
in the United states and a threat to continued development in China. in this atmosphere, 
a failure to cooperate could lead to new recriminations over energy and climate change, 
deepening suspicions of each other’s strategic intentions and straining the bilateral 
relationship in new ways that harm the ability of the two countries to work together on a 
wide range of issues.
 Conversely, if managed successfully, joint U.s.-China stewardship of the climate 
challenge could strengthen strategic ties by building mutual trust at a time when the 
American public is becoming increasingly skeptical of the benefits of bilateral economic 
integration. if U.s.-China cooperation on climate change is aligned constructively with 
other U.s. and Chinese objectives, it will add a new common interest to the mix and 
thereby strengthen the sino-American relationship. Broadening and deepening areas of 
long-term, mutually beneficial cooperation and strategic trust between the two countries 
can only strengthen their ability to cooperate effectively in meeting the broad range of 
strategic challenges of the 21st century. 
16
III. Our Common Challenge
In its global reach, climate change is for China as for the United states—indeed for all 
nations—a truly common challenge. The actions of these two countries must be ultimately 
assayed in terms of their adequacy in contributing to an effective global response. But 
this shared challenge manifests quite differently in different countries: in the level of their 
contribution to climate change, their vulnerability to its impacts, and in their options and 
capacity for response. in the case of the United states and China, these differences have 
important implications for the respective roles and responsibilities each must assume going 
forward, as well as for fruitful areas for collaboration.
The Climate Trajectory
 Climate change is increasingly understood to pose a grave long-term challenge to 
humankind. Driven primarily by a century and a half of rising fossil fuel combustion, 
carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere had reached 379 parts per million by 
2005, 35 percent higher than pre-industrial levels.3 Average global temperatures have risen 
by 0.76 degrees Celsius since the late 1800s, and the effects are evident in extreme weather 
events, changed weather patterns, floods, droughts, glacial and Arctic ice melt, rising sea 
levels, and reduced biodiversity.4 Average temperatures are projected to increase by another 
three degrees upon a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations.5 even if all emissions were 
to stop today, the greenhouse gases already accumulated in the atmosphere will remain 
there for decades to come, resulting in more warming and stronger climate impacts.
 Chinese experts have already observed numerous effects of global warming in China 
that they forecast will only worsen in the future. These include extended drought in the 
north, extreme weather events and flooding in the south, glacial melting in the himalayas 
endangering vital river flows, declining crop yields, and rising seas along heavily-populated 
coastlines.6 The Chinese government, already under pressure to address severe local air 
and water pollution while allowing for continued economic expansion, has begun to 
acknowledge these climate change-related impacts and has expressed increasing concern 
3 “4th Assessment Report, Working Group I, Summary for Policy Makers,” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), 2007. Parts per million (ppm) is the ratio of the number of greenhouse gas molecules to the total number of 
molecules of dry air.  
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. The total temperature increase from 1850–1899 to 2001–2005 is 0.76°C [0.57°C to 0.95°C]. When modeling 
climate system response to sustained radiative forcing, the IPCC states that global average surface warming following a 
doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations is likely to be in the range 2°C to 4.5°C, with a best estimate of about 3°C.
6 “National Assessment Report on Climate Change Released,” Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology December 31, 
2006, http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/pressroom/200612/t20061231_39425.htm. See Lin Erda, Xu Yinlong, Wu Shaohong, 
Ju Hui, and Ma Shiming, “China’s National Assessment Report on Climate Change (II): Climate Change Impacts and Ad-
aptation,” http://www.climatechange.cn/qikan/manage/wenzhang/02.pdf; China’s Policies and Actions to Address Climate 
Change,	Section	II:	“Impact	of	Climate	Change	on	China,”	White	Paper	released	by	the	State	Council	Information	Office,	
October 29, 2008, http://www.china.org.cn/government/news/2008-10/29/content_16681689.htm; and “An Overview of 
Glaciers, Glacial Retreat and Subsequent Impacts in Nepal India and China,” World Wildlife Fund Report, March 2005. 
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that climate change will place additional strains on increasingly scarce resources, especially 
water, that could threaten economic growth.7 
 in the United states, warmer temperatures and shifts in precipitation are already 
affecting water and land resources, agriculture, and biodiversity. Observed changes include 
a northward migration of weeds, and increased incidence of forest fires, insect outbreaks, 
and tree mortality in the west, southwest, and Alaska. Reduced mountain snowpack 
and earlier spring snowmelt also have been observed across the western United states 
and are projected to contribute to worsening water shortages. Other projected impacts 
include reduced livestock production in the summer, a decrease in vegetation in arid 
lands, increased spread of water- and food-borne diseases, and decreased urban air quality.8 
 severe and potentially catastrophic climate impacts are forecast around the world for 
later in the century unless greenhouse gas emissions are dramatically reduced. in its latest 
authoritative assessment, the intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (ipCC) indicated 
that to keep the average global temperature increase within 2-2.8 degrees Celsius—viewed 
by many scientists as a minimum threshold for avoiding dangerous climate change—
concentrations must be stabilized at 445 to 535 parts per million carbon dioxide-equivalent. 
This would require that global emissions peak by 2015 or 2020 and decline 50 percent or 
more below 1990 levels by 2050. 
 At present, however, emissions are moving in the other direction at an unprecedented rate. 
The “business as usual” scenario outlined by the U.s. Department of energy’s energy infor-
mation Administration (eiA) projects that the current world trajectory of emissions growth 
will lead to a 51 percent increase in global carbon emissions between 2005 and 2030.10 
 Reversing these trends and cutting emissions in half by 2050 presents a daunting 
technological challenge. nations now heavily dependent on fossil fuels to power their 
vehicles, homes, factories, and offices must effectively “decarbonize” their energy systems. 
According to a recent analysis by the international energy Agency, this challenge would 
require average annual global deployment over the next 40 years of 55 fossil-fueled power 
plants with carbon capture and storage (CCs), 32 nuclear plants, 17,500 large wind turbines, 
215 million square meters of solar panels, and more than 20 million electric-powered or 
hydrogen fuel cell vehicles.11 
7 “China’s National Climate Change Program,” National Development and Reform Commission, June 2007. See also Pan 
Yue, “Green China, Young China,” www.chinadialogue.net.
8 “The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the United 
States,”	U.S.	Climate	Change	Science	Program,	May	2008,	http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-3/final-
report/Synthesis_SAP_4.3.pdf, and U.S. Climate Change Science Program, “Analyses of the Effects of Global Change on 
Human	Health	and	Welfare	and	Human	Systems,”	May	2008,	http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-6/final-
report/sap4-6-brochure-FAQ.pdf.  
9 A recent analysis, which asserts that carbon dioxide accumulation has already reached 385 ppm, maintains that even 
this	level	of	accumulation	may	pose	significant	climate	dangers.	See	James	Hansen,	Makiko	Sato,	Pushker	Kharecha,	
David Beerling, Robert Berner, Valerie Masson-Delmotte, Mark Pagani, Maureen Raymo, Dana L. Royer, and James 
C. Zachos, “Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?”, The Open Atmospheric Science Journal, vol. 2, 
2008, pp. 217-231.
10 “International Energy Outlook 2008,” Energy Information Administration, June 2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/
index.html. 
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Energy, Emissions, and National Circumstances
 The United states and China are the two largest emitters of energy-related greenhouse 
gas emissions and together account for over 40 percent of all emissions worldwide.12 in 
historic terms, the United states is by far the largest contributor to the greenhouse gases 
now burdening the atmosphere, responsible for 29 percent of energy-related CO2 emissions 
since 1850. China accounts for only about eight percent of these historic emissions. But as 
its economy has boomed, its emissions have soared, and it recently surpassed the United 
states as the world’s largest annual emitter. in 2007, by some estimates, emissions were 14 
percent higher in China than in the United states.13 
 Behind these large numbers, however, lays a gulf of differences between the two top 
emitters. They differ in their stages of development, economic structures, political systems, 
resource endowments, emission drivers, and opportunities for emission reduction. to begin 
with, China’s population is more than four times the size of the United states’, and its per 
capita emissions are 78 percent lower (although China’s per capita emissions are growing 
at a rate four to six times as fast as those of the United states). Despite China’s rapid 
economic ascendancy, it remains a developing country (albeit a strong, emerging economy), 
with a per capita income 30 percent lower than the world average, and an enormous rural 
population living on far less. 
 As more and more Chinese enter the middle class in the coming decades, more cars 
and bigger homes will account for a growing share of the country’s emissions. But at present, 
China’s emissions are dominated by heavy industry. China today produces about 35 percent 
of the world’s steel, 50 percent of its cement, and 28 percent of aluminum manufactured 
worldwide. steel alone emits more CO2 than all Chinese households; the chemical industry 
uses more energy than all the cars on China’s roads; and aluminum smelters consume more 
electricity than the entire commercial sector.15 While some of these products are exported, 
the vast majority are consumed domestically. 
 in the United states, a principal driver of increasing emissions remains population 
11 “Energy Technology Perspectives 2008: Fact Sheet – The Blue Scenario,” International Energy Agency Paris, June, 
2008, http://www.iea.org/Textbase/techno/etp/fact_sheet_ETP2008.pdf. The IEA report points to the urgency, scale, and 
cost of responding to the IPCC challenge: “To meet the most ambitious IPCC scenario aimed at keeping temperature 
increases below 2.4°C, global CO2 emissions would need to be halved by 2050 compared to their current levels. … Total 
additional investment needs for the period 2010-2050, on top of the investments in the Business-as-usual scenario, 
amount	to	USD	$45	trillion.	…	A	significant	discrepancy	exists	between	current	developments	and	the	BLUE	scenario	
targets. We will need in the coming decade a global revolution in the way we produce and use energy, with a dramatic 
shift in government policies and unprecedented co-operation amongst all major economies.”
12 Energy-related CO2 emissions make up approximately 80 percent of total of such emissions to the atmosphere.
13 “China Contributing Two Thirds to Increase in CO2 Emissions,” Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency press 
release, June 13, 2008, http://www.mnp.nl/en/service/pressreleases/2008/20080613Chinacontributingtwothirdstoincre
aseinCO2emissions.html.
14 Trevor Houser, “China’s Energy Consumption and Opportunities for U.S.-China Cooperation to Address the Effects 
of China’s Energy Use,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 14, 2007, 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/written_testimonies/07_06_14_15wrts/07_06_14_houser_statement.php.
15 Trevor Houser, Rob Bradley, Britt Childes, Jacob Werksman, and Robert Keilmayr, “Leveling the Carbon Playing Field: 
International Competition and US Climate Policy Design,” Peterson Institute for International Economics and World 
Resources Institute, May 2008.
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growth; population and emissions have grown 19 percent and 16 percent, respectively, since 
1990. Already well advanced on the development curve, Americans generate high levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions on a per capita basis, about four times the world average, and 
twice the typical european or Japanese. Unlike in China, U.s. emissions stem more from 
consumption than production. industry accounts for just 25 percent of U.s. emissions, with 
most of the rest coming from transportation and commercial and residential energy use. 
 Generally, energy intensity declines as a country develops and becomes more efficient 
in its energy use. The United states made significant gains following the 1970s oil shocks, 
attributable in part to the decline of heavy industry and growth of the services sector, but 
about two-thirds of the savings has been attributed to improvements in energy efficiency.16 
But the rate of efficiency improvement has slowed in recent years, and U.s. energy intensity 
remains well above that of europe and Japan. 
 As part of its economic growth strategy, China was until recently making extraordinary 
gains in reducing energy intensity. From 1980 to 2000, China quadrupled its GDp, pulling 
millions out of poverty, while merely doubling the amount of energy it consumed—a 
dramatic improvement in energy intensity unparalleled in any other country at a similar 
stage of industrialization. however, this trend of decreasing energy intensity reversed 
between 2002 and 2005, with energy growth surpassing economic growth for the first time 
in decades. By 2006, China’s energy demand had grown more in just four years than it had 
during the previous quarter-century, accompanied by a very rapid increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions. China is currently four times as energy intensive as the United states and 
nine times less efficient than Japan.17 
 perhaps the strongest similarity between China and the United states is their heavy 
reliance on coal; they are, respectively, the world’s largest and second largest producers and 
consumers of coal in the world. This is especially important in the climate context, because 
coal is the most carbon-intensive energy source commonly used worldwide. in the United 
states, which has the world’s largest coal reserves, coal fuels 22 percent of primary energy 
and 49 percent of electricity generation. The share of coal used in electricity generation has 
been relatively level in the United states for the past decade, and the amount of new coal 
power capacity proposed in the United states has actually declined in recent years. indeed, 
in 2007 and 2008, more wind power capacity will be built in the United states than new 
coal capacity.18 
 China, with 11 percent of the world’s proven coal reserves, produces and consumes 
about twice as much coal as the United states, and it relies on coal for over two-thirds of 
16 Howard	Geller	and	Sophie	Attali,	“The	Experience	with	Energy	Efficiency	Policies	and	Programmes	in	IEA	Countries:	
Learning from the Critics,” International Energy Agency, 2005. 
17 “International Energy Annual 2005,” Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, October 1, 2007. 
Table 1g: World Energy Intensity—Total Primary Energy Consumption per Dollar of Gross Domestic Product Using Market 
Exchange Rates, 1980-2005.  
18 “Planned Nameplate Capacity Additions from New Generators, by Energy Source,” Electric Power Annual, Energy 
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, October 22, 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/
epat2p4.html.
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its energy needs, including approximately 80 percent of its electricity generation. Moreover, 
the share of coal burned in China’s electricity mix has grown in recent years, despite 
government efforts to diversify the supply with hydropower, nuclear power, and renewable 
power. in 2006 and 2007 alone, China added about 170 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-
fired power plants, more than in the previous six years. Currently, there are more coal-
fired power plants in China than in the United states, the United Kingdom, and india 
combined. Finally, China’s coal power use is expected to more than double in size by 2030, 
generating an additional 86 billion tons of carbon emissions.19 
 Apart from its heavy contribution to climate change, use of coal also presents a serious 
environmental and public health threat in China. Coal combustion produces a range of 
harmful air pollutants, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and 
mercury, as well as significant water pollution. Combustion is the source of 85 percent 
of the country’s sO2 emissions, which cause acid rain and are responsible for RMB 30 
billion ($4 billion) in crop damage and RMB 7 billion ($1 billion) in material damage 
annually.20 Although the Chinese government has adopted relatively stringent regulations 
to reduce coal-related emissions, implementation lags and enforcement is often lax, in part 
because running pollution control equipment reduces the net power output of a power 
plant, resulting in lost revenue for power producers. 
 The mining of coal also poses serious environmental and health dangers. The thousands 
of small mines that produce about a third of China’s coal supply, many of them illegal, 
unregistered, and unregulated, are a major source of air, water, and land pollution.21 Coal 
mining and washing can result in overuse of groundwater and a consequent lowering of water 
tables. This is a particular problem in the already water-scarce regions of northwest China, 
where mining has been a contributing factor in growing desertification.22 Mine safety is also 
a major issue: in 2005, there were 3,306 coal mine accidents in China resulting in 5,938 
deaths.23 A recent study estimates the total environmental costs of coal to China at RMB 
1,745 billion ($250 billion) in 2007, equal to 7.1 per cent of China’s GDp for that year.24 
 Despite the many differences between the social and economic circumstances of China 
and the United states, they, like other nations, are confronted with some core common 
challenges. On the climate front, the challenge is to make economies less energy-intensive 
and energy systems less carbon-intensive. On the energy security front, the challenge lies 
in maximizing the supply of sustainable, reliable, affordable, domestic energy. in many 
19 “International Energy Outlook 2007,” Chapter 5, Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, May 
2007, , http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html.
20 Cost of Pollution in China, World Bank and China State Environmental Protection Administration, February 2007.
21Yang Yang, “A China Environmental Health Project Research Brief: Coal Mining and Environmental Health in China,” 
Wilson Center China Environment Forum, April 2, 2007. Available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/coalmin-
ing_april2.pdf.
22 Ibid. 
23 Mao Yushi, Sheng Hong, and Yang Fuqiang, “The True Cost of Coal,” Greenpeace and the Energy Foundation China 
Sustainable Energy Program, October 2008.
24 Ibid.
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areas, these two objectives are clearly complementary. For instance, both China and 
the United states can greatly improve their energy effi  ciency, which by reducing energy 
demand, would curb emissions and strengthen energy security. similarly, an expansion 
of renewable energy would address both challenges by providing clean, domestic energy 
alternatives. Reconciling the climate and energy security agendas is more diffi  cult, however, 
in the case of coal. As a plentiful domestic energy source, coal seems certain to remain a 
mainstay of both economies’ energy systems. But to eff ectively address climate change, 
while continuing to rely on coal, will require large-scale investments in technology and 
infrastructure, a process that can only be made more transformational by new forms of 
bilateral cooperation.
Figure 1. United States and China: Annual and Cumulative Emissions25 
25 Data sources: “CO2 Emissions From Fossil Fuels,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis 
Center (CDIAC), 2007; The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP), 2007; Statistical Review of World 
Energy, BP; IEA, 2007; World Bank database (population data), 2007; CDIAC-ORNL, MNP, BP, USGS (cement), IEA, 
World Bank.
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Figure 2. United States and China: Energy Intensity Trends (1980-2005)26 
Figure 3. GDP, Energy Demand and CO2 Emissions by Sector: 
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26 Data source: “International Energy Outlook, 2007,” Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy.
27 Sources: “CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion,” International Energy Agency; Daniel Rosen and Trevor Houser, 
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28 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Electricity Data (2008), available at http://www.eia.
doe.gov/fuelelectric.html.
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Figure 5. China’s Power Sector29 
29 Note: Renewable electricity (including wind and biomass) represented less than 1 percent of power generation in 
2005. Sources: China Energy Databook, China Energy Group, Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory, Energy Statistics 
Yearbook, United Nations Statistics Division, 2005; “World Energy Outlook 2007,” International Energy Agency.
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Efforts to Date
 While neither the United states nor China has yet undertaken efforts of the scale 
needed to contain global emissions, both countries, sometimes in collaboration, have taken 
some important initial steps.
 in the United states, the federal government has a long track record of support for 
climate science and technology research initiatives, but it has not undertaken comprehensive 
or mandatory efforts to reduce U.s. greenhouse gas emissions. significant reduction efforts 
have emerged at the state level, however. twenty-four of the 50 states are now participating 
in regional initiatives to reduce emissions through cap-and-trade systems: 
•  The northeastern states’ Regional Greenhouse Gas initiative recently conducted its 
first auction of emission allowances. 
•  California has set a mandatory goal of reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, 
and has joined six other states (and four Canadian provinces) in the Western Climate 
initiative to establish a regional cap-and-trade system with the same goal. 
• A similar collaborative effort is underway in the Midwest. 
 spurred in part by these state efforts, Congress has begun seriously debating the design 
of a national cap-and-trade system and other policies to reduce emissions economy-wide. 
A range of proposed legislative measures that aim to reduce emissions 60 percent to 80 
percent by 2050 await congressional action. One of the major challenges before the new 
U.s. Administration is how best to regulate emissions at the national level in the context of 
a comprehensive energy and climate strategy.
 in China, the government has adopted a national Climate Change program outlining 
an array of programs and policies helping to address climate change in the areas of 
energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear power, land use and forestry, and technology 
development.30 Domestic policies that could achieve significant greenhouse gas reductions 
include a national target to reduce energy intensity by 20 percent from 2005 levels by 2010, 
and a target for 16 percent of electricity to come from renewable energy sources by 2020. 
in addition, several energy-intensive products are no longer eligible for a Value Added tax 
(VAt) refund on exports, creating a disincentive for exporting energy-intensive products 
from China.31 
 Most, if not all, of these policies have been driven primarily by non-climate related 
objectives such as economic growth, improved air quality, and energy security. But each 
makes an undeniable contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions growth, with the 
government often providing specific estimates of projected emission savings. The national 
30 See Joanna I. Lewis, “China’s Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations,” The Washington 
Quarterly, Winter 2007-2008.
31 “Client Alert: China Adjusts Export VAT Refund Rates,” Baker & McKenzie, June 2007, http://www.bakernet.com/NR/
rdonlyres/FAF9847C-3EDE-4EF9-BA9C-DF073B3C9DE6/0/china_exportvat_ca_jun07.pdf
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Climate Change program outlines additional policies to be undertaken, and areas where 
China’s efforts would benefit from international cooperation.
 For nearly 30 years, the United states and China have collaborated in a wide array 
of energy and environmental initiatives.32 This cooperation has led to a much deeper 
mutual understanding of each country’s circumstances and concerns, facilitated valuable 
exchanges of information and best practices, and forged important ties between leading 
research institutions. too often, however, cooperation has been miscellaneous and episodic 
rather than sustained. it has also been undermined by insufficient funding, shifting policy 
priorities, and failure to significantly “scale-up” promising projects. The cancellation or 
down-scaling by the United states of key projects have led to an understandable skepticism 
in China on the prospects for stronger long-term cooperation. Recent examples include 
the expiration and eventual renewal of the U.s.-China protocol on energy efficiency and 
Renewable energy, and the postponement and significant restructuring of the FutureGen 
project to build a commercial-scale advanced generation coal plant with carbon capture 
and storage, in which China was a partner.33 
 With sustained high-level support, however, these past cooperative efforts could serve 
as the foundation for a new partnership between the United states and China, one that 
capitalizes on each country’s individual strengths to address common challenges and 
yield mutual benefits. The following sections recommend key areas and concrete means of 
collaboration.
32 See Appendix 1: Timeline of Government Initiatives for U.S.-China Energy and Climate Change Cooperation, at the end 
of this Report.
33 “U.S.	and	China	Announce	Cooperation	on	FutureGen	and	Sign	Energy	Efficiency	Protocol	at	U.S.-China	Strategic	 
Economic Dialogue,” U.S. Department of Energy Press Releases, December 15, 2006, http://www.energy.
gov/news/4535.htm; and January 30, 2008; “DOE Announces Restructured FutureGen Approach to Demon-
strate Carbon Capture and Storage Technology at Multiple Clean Coal Plants,” http://www.fossil.energy.gov/news/
techlines/2008/08003-DOE_Announces_Restructured_FutureG.html.
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IV. A Collaborative Response
In the realm of energy and climate, there are countless areas where deeper cooperation 
between the United states and China could reap benefits for both countries and for the 
international community.  Given limited resources, however, and the urgency of mobilizing 
effective action, it is critical that a new U.s.-China partnership on climate and energy be 
not only strategically targeted but also well coordinated. Of highest priority should be 
those areas that: 
 a) have the greatest potential for reducing emissions and strengthening energy security;
 b) would benefit most from direct collaboration.
1. Deploying Low-Emissions Coal Technologies 
Because of the energy security benefits it provides each country, the United States and 
China have a shared interest in developing a low-carbon means of continuing to rely on 
coal as a major energy source. 
 The United states and China share a uniquely common interest in devising strategies 
to allow them to continue their reliance on coal in a carbon-constrained world. Given the 
substantial domestic coal reserves in each country and their heavy investment in coal-
based electrical generating capacity, coal will likely remain an inescapable mainstay of 
their economies for decades to come. to render coal a climate-friendly energy source, 
however, will require significant advances and sustained investment in new technologies 
to burn it more efficiently as well as to capture and sequester the resulting greenhouse gas 
emissions.
 in the near term, the priority is to ensure that new plants being deployed are high 
efficiency, and that existing plants run as efficiently as possible. in China, the average 
efficiency of coal power plants is rapidly catching up to that of developed countries as new, 
larger units come online and smaller, less-efficient units are shut down. it is estimated 
that the average efficiency of China’s coal-fired fleet was 32 percent in 2005, but is 
expected to approach 40 percent by 2030 as more large supercritical units come online 
and older subcritical units are phased out.35 While China already has a few state-of-the-
art ultra-supercritical power plants and coal gasification plants, and an increasing number 
of supercritical plants are coming online (20 percent of those newly built in 2006), the 
majority of new plants being deployed in China are still subcritical plants. 
 in the United states, the majority of existing coal plants were built before 1989 
using subcritical pulverized coal technology. While many new coal plants in the approval 
stage propose using integrated gasification combined cycle (iGCC) and supercritical 
34 Other areas that were not prioritized in this Report but are important for collaboration include nuclear energy and 
transportation technologies.
35 “CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion,” International Energy Agency, op.cit.
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technology, the majority of projects in the pipeline still plan to use less efficient 
subcritical technology.36 
 in both countries, there are clearly opportunities to deploy higher efficiency, 
commercially available coal power technologies for new plants. in addition, the efficiency of 
existing coal plants can often be substantially improved through a variety of technical and 
institutional changes, including the use of higher quality coal, improved plant operation, 
better maintenance and management practices, and new incentives for greater efficiency 
(e.g., through routinely auditing plant efficiency and rewarding improvements). 
 Though not yet commercially available for widespread use in coal-fueled power plants, 
existing technologies could be used to prevent most of the CO2 emissions from large-scale 
combustion or gasification from entering the atmosphere. such technologies, referred to 
as carbon capture and sequestration, or CCs, involve separating CO2 from other exhaust 
gases, compressing the “captured” CO2, and transporting it through pipelines for storage 
in deep, underground geological formations such as depleted oil wells. it is estimated 
that over 99 percent of CO2 properly injected into geologic formations will remain there 
for one thousand years.37 The capture process can be done pre-combustion along with 
coal gasification, or post-combustion in pulverized coal plants through either chemical 
separation or by burning coal in pure oxygen (Oxyfuel capture). however, many of these 
capture processes and technologies are still in the early stages of development, although 
several gasification plants have recently been deployed in the United states, and a few 
demonstration projects are now planned in China. 
 The United states currently has no complete CCs demonstration projects in 
operation, although the U.s. Department of energy (DOe) is planning to support an 
iGCC demonstration plant with CCs through its FutureGen program. China, however, 
is planning several CCs demonstration projects including GreenGen (a 400-megawatt 
iGCC plant with CCs being added in phase three by 2020),38 and the near Zero emission 
Coal (nZeC) partnership between China, the european Union, and the United Kingdom, 
with the goal of having a coal plant with CCs online by 2020).39 
 China’s huaneng power Company, in cooperation with the Australian Commonwealth 
scientific and industrial Research Organization (CsiRO), has also launched a post-
combustion carbon capture project (without storage).40 several pilot CO2 geologic storage 
projects are also underway in the United states and China, including ones used for 
36 “Tracking New Coal Fired Power Plants,” National Energy Technology Laboratory, June 30, 2008, http://www.netl.doe.
gov/coal/refshelf/ncp.pdf. 
37 Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, IPCC, 2005.
38Xu Shisen, “Green Coal-based Power Generation for Tomorrow’s Power,” Thermal Power Research Institute, presenta-
tion to the APEC Energy Working Group: Expert Group on Clean Fossil Energy, Lampang, Thailand, February 24, 2006.
39 “EU-China Summit: Joint Statement,” European Commission, September 5, 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/exter-
nal_relations/china/summit_0905/index.htm; UK Department of Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs, 2005, http://
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/internat/devcountry/china.htm. 
40 “Carbon Capture Milestone In China,” ScienceDaily, August 4, 2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2008/07/080731135924.htm 
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enhanced oil recovery (eOR) in depleted oil wells. Assessments show that the United 
states has extensive potential carbon storage capacity in geologic reservoirs throughout 
the country.41 some initial assessments of storage capacity have been performed in China, 
but far more detailed assessments are needed before CCs can become more than an 
idea. 
 An ultimate goal in both countries must be the commercialization and widespread 
deployment of carbon capture-and-storage technology. As a critical first step, experts 
recommend that 10 to 15 large-scale demonstration projects be developed in a variety of 
settings around the world over the next decade.42 As China is currently building two large 
coal-fired power plants a week and is projected to account for as much as 46 percent of 
global coal demand by 2030, its participation in any such global effort is critical, both 
to reduce its emissions and to achieve economies of scale large enough to bring down the 
cost. But key hurdles in meeting this challenge include the large incremental cost and 
the “energy penalty” of running the capture equipment, which can reduce a plant’s 
combustion efficiency up to 30 percent. This penalty would essentially mean that China 
would need to build three coal plants a week rather than two to generate the same amount 
of electricity. China also is wary of pressure to demonstrate and adopt a technology not yet 
in commercial use in the developed world.
Recommendations
• Conduct Joint CCS demonstrations. 
  The United States and China should conduct carbon capture and storage demonstra-
tion projects in both countries with the goal of jointly assessing their cost, viability, 
and effectiveness. 
 The United states and China should initiate a major new coordination of their joint and 
separate demonstration projects to ensure that they collectively embrace the full spectrum 
of power generation and capture technologies in as many different sequestration geologies 
as possible. Both governments should establish a sizable and reliable source of public and 
private funding to immediately begin the construction of new CCs demonstration projects. 
proposals for specific demonstration configurations should come from the private sector, 
with requirements made for data sharing between both Chinese and U.s. scientists to better 
understand the performance of the project. 
 siting decisions for demonstration projects should be done on a domestic basis, 
with each national government taking on the liability associated with gas storage or the 
decommissioning costs in order to best reduce investment risk. Demonstration projects 
should aim to achieve low-carbon fuel cycles, not just components that are individually 
attractive, such as enhanced oil recovery. Complete life-cycle emissions assessments should 
41 Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the United States and Canada, National Energy Technology Laboratory 2007. 
42 The Future of Coal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007.
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then be used to rate and evaluate the demonstration projects.43 
 The funding for these demonstration projects can come from a variety of sources and 
mechanisms, including through the levying of charges on fossil fuel-generated electricity 
from plants that do not deploy CCs, or through premium payments for “green electricity” 
made by companies. in the United states, further experimentation with CCs could be 
financed through a portion of the value of carbon allowances generated in a future “cap 
and trade” program to regulate carbon emissions. in China, funding could be generated 
through international offsets (although CCs is not presently recognized under the Kyoto 
protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism). China could also opt to utilize development 
bank loans. in any case, each government would have to experiment with how it might 
offer the most favorable loan terms to finance CCs demonstration projects using the most 
promising foreign or domestic technologies. 
 Once demonstration projects have provided operational experience, a joint assessment 
of the effectiveness of the projects should be conducted so that the United states and China 
could then jointly make further key decisions surrounding the future viability, replicability, 
and scalability of CCs.
• Ensure any coal plants deployed are high-efficiency. 
  In order to increase the efficiency of existing power plants, and ensure that new 
plants utilize high-efficiency coal technologies, the United States and China should 
jointly assess and undertake immediate policy options to create new incentives for 
these practices. 
 The United states and China should form a joint government-industry alliance with the 
specific goal of determining how to ensure that additional coal-fired power plants deployed 
in either country use high-efficiency coal power, and even CCs technology. Government and 
industry should offer information about the existing costs and risks associated with advanced 
pulverized coal and coal gasification technology. Then, governments in both countries 
should examine relevant policy models to provide co-funding to buy down the technical 
and financial risks associated with technology advancements in their own countries. 
• Develop regulatory frameworks for CCS to facilitate timely deployment.
  The United States and China should jointly develop best safety standards and technical 
practices in national policy design for CCS to facilitate timely deployment.
43 In addition to the ongoing bilateral governmental cooperation between the United States and China on coal described 
in Appendix I, there are many non-governmental and academic initiatives, including the Energy Foundation China  
Sustainable Energy Program’s work with Institute of Engineering Thermophysics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences  
to develop policies and incentives that accelerate the development and demonstration of IGCC technologies with CCS.  
In addition, researchers at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government are working with the China Ministry  
of Science and Technology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences on advanced coal policy and economics.  
See http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/10/energy_technology_innovation_policy.html?page_id=166. 
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 Regulations governing CO2 storage should provide the level of predictability that 
project developers need to make investment decisions. Regulations should also be adaptable 
to new knowledge gained though joint experience with CCs demonstrations that relates to 
protecting human health and safety, ecosystems, underground sources of drinking water, 
and other natural resources.44
• Map geological storage.
  The United States and China should undertake joint efforts to conduct more extensive 
mapping of geological storage to directly support the future deployment of CCS. 
 public-private collaborations in each country should be encouraged in the mapping of 
storage sites so that data can be made readily available to governments in both countries as 
they engage in future capacity planning. 
• Conduct joint R&D on new CCS technologies 
  The United States and China should initiate a major new joint research and 
development project on innovative CCS technologies. 
 in addition to the commercial-scale demonstration of existing technologies, U.s. and 
Chinese scientists and engineers should be supported in a coordinated series of publicly- and 
privately-funded research collaborations to jointly develop more advanced and innovative 
CCs technologies that could be used in both countries. While initial demonstration 
projects will utilize CCs technologies that were primarily developed for other applications, 
efficiency and performance gains may be achievable with further research in the context of 
coal-fired industrial plants. Models for the sharing of useful outputs among the researchers 
of both countries, including intellectual property, technical know-how, and on-the-ground 
practice should be encouraged and broadened. 
2. Improving Energy Efficiency and Conservation
To reduce greenhouse gas emissions, enhance national energy security, and save money, 
the United States and China both need to prioritize and expand energy efficiency and 
conservation efforts. 
 
 in the near term, the most significant step that the United states and China can take 
to reduce their emissions and enhance their energy security is to reduce energy demand 
through greater efficiency and conservation. in many cases, these efforts also promise 
significant economic benefits, with only modest upfront investments returning substantial 
long-term savings through lower energy costs.
44 A stakeholder process that has worked to inform such regulations in the United States is the World Resources Institute 
CCS Guidelines Process, http://www.wri.org/project/carbon-capture-sequestration.
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 indeed, energy efficiency measures are often characterized as “negative cost” 
opportunities, meaning that they result in positive economic returns over the lifetime of 
the investment. A recent McKinsey study estimates that 40 percent of emissions abatement 
opportunities in the United states could be achieved at “negative” cost by, for instance, 
improving building insulation and lighting, and by using more fuel-efficient vehicles and 
appliances.45 however, these potential gains often remain unrealized because of market 
inefficiencies, lack of information, government neglect, and shortages of upfront capital. 
More targeted government policies are needed in both countries to overcome these market 
barriers.
 China has made enormous strides through comprehensive national programs to 
improve energy efficiency. From 1980 to 2000, China was able to quadruple its GDp while 
only doubling its energy consumption, an unprecedented achievement in any country’s 
development history. Achieving the government’s current goal of reducing national energy 
intensity 20 percent below 2005 levels by 2010 would translate into an annual greenhouse 
gas reduction of more than 1.5 billion tons, making it one of the most significant carbon 
mitigation efforts in the world.46 After signs of inadequate progress toward achieving 
these objectives, the central government recently stepped up efforts to set and enforce 
corresponding goals at the local level, where much of the slippage was occurring.47 
 Related efforts in China include programs to improve energy efficiency in the country’s 
largest industrial enterprises and to retire older, inefficient power plants and factories.48 in 
the construction and industrial sectors, China’s 1997 energy Conservation Law initiated a 
range of programs to increase energy efficiency in buildings, industry, and consumer goods, 
many of which were modeled after U.s. programs. 
 in the transport sector, China’s fuel economy standards for its rapidly growing passenger 
vehicle fleet are now more stringent than those in Australia, Canada, and the United states 
(although they are less stringent than those in the european Union and Japan). The average 
fuel economy of new vehicles is projected to reach 36.7 miles per gallon in 2008.49 however, 
in the trucking sector, standards are still low, leaving much room for improvement. 
 Though the U.s. federal government lacks a comprehensive, mandatory efficiency 
program, individual states have implemented efficiency policies such as incentives and 
targets. in many cases, state policies have been created to implement efficiency initiatives 
45 “Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: How Much at What Cost?”, McKinsey & Company and The Conference 
Board,	2007,	http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/U.S._ghg_final_report.pdf.	
46 Jiang Lin, Nan Zhou, Mark Levine, and David Fridley, “Taking Out 1 Billion Tons of CO2: The Magic of China’s 11th 
Five Year Plan?”, Energy Policy, no. 36, 2008. 
47 Mure	Dickie	and	Richard	McGregor,	“Jiangsu	Sets	the	Pace	on	How	to	Assess	Officials,”	Financial Times, March 15, 
2007;	“Chinese	Officials	Face	Scrutiny	over	Failure	to	Meet	Emission	Targets,”	Xinhua	News	Agency,	November	29,	2007.
48 Lynn Price and Xuejun Wang, “Constraining Energy Consumption of China’s Largest Industrial Enterprises Through 
Top-1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprise Program,” Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, June 2007, http://ies.lbl.gov/
iespubs/LBNL-62874.pdf.
49 An Feng and Amanda Sauer, “Comparison of Passenger Vehicle Fuel Economy and GHG Emission Standards Around 
the World,” The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, December 2004. 
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/fuel_economy. 
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where no federal policies exist or where states have sought to reduce emissions beyond the 
federal standards. Federal automotive fuel economy standards (Corporate Average Fuel 
economy, or CAFÉ, standards), in place since 1975, were increased in 2007 to require an 
average of 35 miles per gallon by 2020 for new passenger vehicles and light trucks. At the 
state level, California established standards to reduce vehicle greenhouse gas emissions in 
2002, and 16 other states have now adopted them, but the federal government has yet to 
issue a waiver allowing them to be implemented. 
 energy efficiency has also been incorporated into state and federal policy through 
building codes, appliance standards, utility demand-side management, and lead-by-
example programs. About three dozen states have residential and commercial building 
efficiency codes, and many have established appliance standards that exceed federal 
requirements. states have also promoted efficiency by requiring utility-driven energy 
reductions. seventeen states now have energy efficiency Resource standards—targets 
for utilities to reduce energy demand through end-use efficiency while 22 states authorize 
utilities to collect fees enabling them to implement efficiency programs through use of 
these “public benefits funds.” 
Recommendations 
• Expand energy efficiency programs. 
  The United States and China should increase national and sub-national cooperation 
on the exchange and implementation of innovative policies and programs targeting 
strategies for market transformation. 
 At the national level, U.s.-China cooperation should focus on best practices for 
energy efficiency standards and labeling programs, as well as for benchmarking programs 
targeting energy intensity in heavy industry. At the state and provincial level, U.s. and 
Chinese experiences implementing energy efficiency resource standards and demand-side 
management programs should be comprehensively and systematically exchanged.50 
• Target company-level incentives and opportunities. 
  New incentives to promote energy efficiency at the firm level should be mandated by 
the governments and expanded. 
 inefficient small and medium enterprises should be targeted through government and 
industry-sponsored energy efficiency programs that encompass the entire supply chain. 
Both governments should collaborate on new ways to encourage private sector efforts to 
50 In	addition	to	ongoing	U.S.-China	bilateral	cooperation	on	energy	efficiency	described	in	Appendix	I,	there	is	state-pro-
vincial cooperation (for example, between California and Jiangsu Province) and extensive non-governmental cooperation, 
including through projects being implemented by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s China Energy Group (http://
china.lbl.gov) and the Energy Foundation China Sustainable Energy Program (http:///www.efchina.org).
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reduce energy consumption throughout the value chain by means of energy efficiency 
incentives that expand beyond the final manufactured product to include the complete 
supply chain. The final distributor should be responsible for ensuring that such standards 
are met. Labeling programs can be used to acknowledge high-performance suppliers.51 
 Cooperation on industrial energy audit and benchmarking programs should also be 
expanded to highlight inefficiencies in major energy-consuming enterprises. The United 
states and China should exchange information and develop programs that promote 
information about energy-efficiency equipment and measures available to each industrial 
sector.
• Seek a global agreement to improve vehicle fuel economy. 
  The United States and China should lead an effort to develop an agreement among 
countries that are major automobile producers or markets to promote a new 
generation of high-efficiency vehicles.  
 A relatively small number of countries account for the vast majority of automotive 
production and consumption worldwide. A sectoral agreement among these countries 
could effectively transform the global automotive market. An agreement could advance 
low-carbon technologies by coordinating research and development, and by establishing 
fuel economy or greenhouse gas emissions standards differentiated to reflect national 
circumstances. it could be a stand-alone agreement or be integrated into a comprehensive 
climate accord. The United states, as the world’s largest auto manufacturer, and China, 
as the world’s fastest growing automotive market, are uniquely positioned to lead other 
governments in developing such an agreement. 
3. Developing an Advanced Electric Grid
An advanced, efficient electric power grid is crucial to ensuring that our transmission 
and distribution infrastructure can enable the expanded development of renewable energy 
projects and the secure, reliable delivery of electricity.
 As the United states and China explore energy futures likely to include much higher 
levels of renewable energy, both countries are faced with the same key obstacle to fully 
utilizing these new sources: outdated and poorly designed electric grids. Current grid 
technology used in both countries is plagued with inefficiencies, and is ill-suited to handle 
long distance transmission from sources of renewable power-rich areas to high-load centers, 
or to handle the intermittent nature of renewable power sources. 
51 For example, Wal-Mart CEO Lee Scott has announced a range of objectives for using its market power to raise  
standards in its vast supply chain in China, including targets for the reduction of water and energy usage, reductions  
in packaging, and commitments to develop more sustainable products. “Wal-Mart to Seek Greener Supply Chain,”  
Financial Times, October 22, 2008.
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 in addition, both countries share an important feature: exceptional wind resources and 
excellent solar thermal power-producing areas that lie far away from the largest power-using 
population centers. More intelligent grid control systems that exploit cutting edge digital 
controls, electronic switching, and higher capacity transmission lines will help facilitate 
the transmission and utilization of much larger amounts of renewable energy.52 in addition, 
new technologies for storing electricity will need to be used to counter the variability of 
renewable resource availability.53 
 Attention to improved grid management and least-cost transmission systems can 
greatly expand the carbon reduction potential and help stimulate a new expertise base and 
vitally-needed export industry for both nations. 
Recommendations
• Develop new technologies to improve grid efficiency.
  The United States and China should undertake joint and parallel efforts to improve 
the efficiency of their respective transmission and distribution systems, and work to 
jointly develop new power electronic technologies for smart grid management. 
• Demonstrate smart grid systems.
  The United States and China should establish joint smart grid demonstration 
projects. These “test beds” should be used to experiment with the deployment of 
various configurations of new smart grid technologies. 
• Study grid stability measures for expanded renewable energy systems.
  Since the United States and China are poised to be the two largest global markets 
for wind power in the coming years, joint demonstrations should initially focus 
on barriers to the current power grid handling large amounts of episodic wind-
generated electricity. The expanded use of storage technologies should also be jointly 
examined and explored. Based on this study, both countries should jointly pursue 
demonstrations in areas of high wind penetration to inform new grid design and 
related policy developments. 
 Additional joint efforts should examine how power grids can be upgraded and expanded 
to allow for and promote the wide-spread use of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (pheV), or 
fully electric vehicles.
52 National Electric Delivery Technologies Vision and Roadmap, U.S. Department of Energy 2004, http://www.energetics.
com/pdfs/electric_power/electric_roadmap.pdf. 
53 For	example:	elevated	reservoirs,	superconducting	batteries,	flywheels,	magnets,	rock	and	salt	storage	of	heat,	and	under-
ground compressed air. See Roger N. Anderson, “The Distributed Storage-Generation ‘Smart’ Electric Grid of the Future,” from 
proceedings, “The 10-50 Solution: Technologies and Policies for a Low-Carbon Future,” workshop sponsored by the Pew Cen-
ter on Global Climate Change and the National Commission on Energy Policy, March  25-26, 2004, http://www.pewclimate.
org/global-warming-in-depth/workshops_and_conferences/tenfifty.	See	also	The	Pew	Center	on	Global	Climate	Change	and	the	
National Commission on Energy Policy, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/10-50_Anderson_120604_120713.pdf.
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4. Promoting Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy technologies are the key to achieving a diversified, low-carbon energy 
future fueled by a wide variety of domestic energy sources, manufactured and installed by 
an expanding field of companies providing new domestic, green-collar jobs.
 China and the United states are two of the world’s renewable energy leaders. China 
now gets about 17 percent of its electricity, and seven percent of its total energy, from 
renewable sources. The United states derives nine percent of its electricity and six percent of 
its total energy from renewables. still, in both countries, renewable sources could be much 
more broadly deployed, particularly if facilitated by a modernized electrical grid capable of 
accommodating the intermittent nature of most renewable resources and moving electrical 
power over longer distances more efficiently.
 China’s primary source of renewable electricity is hydropower generated from large 
dams and micro-turbines. its hydropower capacity, about 145 GW, is the largest in the 
world and is projected to more than double by 2020, requiring the equivalent of a new dam 
the size of the Three Gorges project to be constructed every two years. 
 China’s wind power capacity has been growing at over 100 percent per year, expanding 
from 1,266 megawatts (MW) in 2005 to 2,600 MW in 2006 and 5,900 MW in 2007. 
China also has moved aggressively on the solar front and has now become the world’s 
largest manufacturer of photovoltaic cells, currently accounting for 35 percent of the global 
market.54 China now manufacturers and utilizes more solar water heaters than the rest of 
the world combined. 
 to promote further expansion of sustainable energy sources, China’s national 
Renewable energy Law has set targets for producing 20 percent of the nation’s electricity 
and 16 percent of its primary energy from renewable sources by 2020. incentives include 
a national fund to foster renewable energy development and discounted lending and tax 
preferences for renewable energy projects. China has also implemented policies supporting 
the development of new domestic technologies and industries by, for instance, requiring the 
use of domestically manufactured components. Government policies are also encouraging 
production of biofuels by promulgating aggressive targets to scaleup biofuel utilization by 
2012. 
 in the United states, renewable energy incentives and mandates have been largely carried 
out through state policies rather than federal action. Currently, 29 states and the District of 
Columbia have implemented Renewable portfolio standards (Rps), which establish targets 
for renewable energy integration into state energy production portfolios. Many have also 
implemented policies requiring utilities to offer net metering, which encourages on-site 
generation by connecting producers to the main grid, such as a home providing excess 




electricity produced by its own solar voltaic system to the utility. (A federal Rps has been 
proposed but has not yet found sufficient support for congressional approval.) 
 Currently, most federal support for renewable energy has come in the form of tax 
incentives. For example, the production tax Credit (ptC) has, over the last two years, 
been credited with making the United states the largest wind market in the world.55 Most 
recently, the 2008 emergency economic stabilization Act (eesA) extended or expanded 
tax credits for qualified solar, wind, geothermal, and fuel cell projects as well as low-
emission systems such as microturbines and cogeneration.56 The federal government also 
has established a federal Renewable Fuels standard requiring the production of 36 billion 
gallons of biofuel in 2022, and about 40 states have created their own renewable fuels 
standards or incentives.
 in sum, much is going on in each country, but coordination within each country, 
much less comprehensive collaboration between the United states and China, is still 
insufficient. in both countries, renewables could be significantly expanded and the key 
renewable resources that have only begun to be exploited for power generation are wind 
and solar. Although wind energy is growing rapidly in the United states and China, it only 
accounts for a very small share of total electricity generation in each country. in contrast, 
Denmark now derives about 20 percent of its electricity from wind, and the schleswig-
holstein state of Germany now gets between 25 and 50 percent of its electricity in any given 
month from wind. 
 The global position of both the United states and China as leading wind and solar 
power technology manufacturers means that scaling-up these technologies could also 
support major expansion of these domestic industries.57 indeed, recent technical advances 
in solar energy make it poised for significant cost reductions in the coming years. Thin 
film and plastic solar cells, long of interest to the research community, have now been 
re-engineered to provide significantly higher efficiencies than seen over the past decade. 
Organic cells, with the potential for significantly lower costs—well under $0.50 per peak 
watt—are now beginning to be viewed as potentially commercially viable.58 initiatives to 
demonstrate concentrated solar thermal power technology (Csp) in the desert regions of 
the United states and China are underway.
 
55 Under present law, an income tax credit of 2.1 cents/kilowatt-hour is allowed for the production of electricity from 
utility-scale wind turbines. This incentive, the renewable energy Production Tax Credit (PTC), was created under the  
Energy	Policy	Act	of	1992	(at	the	value	of	1.5	cents/kilowatt-hour,	which	has	since	been	adjusted	annually	for	inflation).	
In October 2008, Congress acted to provide a one-year extension of the Production Tax Credit through December 31, 
2009. Source: The American Wind Energy Association, http://www.awea.org/legislative/#PTC.
56 Tax credits, while effective in times where companies carry large tax burdens, are likely to be much less effective in 
times of economic downturn, and renewable development in the United States may suffer in 2008 as a result.
57 Chinese manufacturers now produce about 40 percent of the wind turbines sold annually in China, and U.S. manufac-
turers produce 45 percent of the turbines sold in the United States.
58 Daniel M. Kammen, “Renewable Energy Options for the Emerging Economy: Advances, Opportunities and Obstacles,” 




• Jointly refine and develop new renewable energy technologies.
  Joint research and development initiatives on renewable energy that target specific areas 
of mutual interest and limited national experience should be pursued. These should 
include such areas as solar electric and thermal energy storage and biofuel technologies. 
 Joint projects in solar R&D should include technologies with the potential to drive 
significant cost reductions. such areas should include: thin film, plastic, and organic cells. 
 in the area of storage technologies, R&D should examine a wide range of applications, 
including small-scale storage (such as appliance batteries); distributed, medium-scale storage 
(such as battery storage facilities in utility applications); large-scale storage (such as pumped 
hydroelectric dams); and other forms of storage including flywheels, compressed air, capacitors, 
heated and salt formations, and superconducting magnetic energy storage systems. 
 in the field of biofuels, research should include the land and water resource implications of 
different technologies, and the long-term carbon implications, and the best feedstock options 
for U.s. and Chinese national circumstances.
• Address crucial information barriers to renewable energy development.
  Additional U.S.-China cooperation on renewable energy should target the sharing of 
expertise in planning for the expanded utilization of renewable energy through the 
assessment and mapping of renewable resources in the United States and China, the 
planning of electricity transmission additions and upgrades, the testing and certification 
of new technologies, and the quantification of the economic benefits of renewables. 
 The mapping of renewable resources should assess resource availability at a high level of 
resolution that can inform national planning on achievable renewable energy targets, as well as 
project-level siting decisions. Based on the joint demonstration of advanced grid technologies, 
as well as the renewable resource assessment, experts in both countries should develop models 
for updating and expanding transmission capacity to bring renewable power from resource 
locations to demand centers. technology certification programs should be designed to improve 
consumer confidence in the quality and reliability of new renewable energy technologies being 
developed in the United states and China, and be based on best practice certification models 
around the world. to aid policymakers in justifying expansive renewable energy promotion 
programs, the United states and China should exchange best practice methodologies for 
quantifying the economic and environmental benefits of renewable energy, with special 
attention given to employment and spillover benefits throughout the economy.59 
59 In addition to the bilateral cooperation on renewable energy listed in Appendix I, there is also some non-governmental 
cooperation, including the Energy Foundation’s renewable energy policy support being provided to key organizations in 
China, including the NDRC’s Center for Renewable Energy Development, Tsinghua University’s Institute of Energy,  
Environment and Economy, the China Renewable Energy Industries Association, and the China Wind Energy Association. 
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5. Quantifying Emissions and Financing Low-Carbon Technologies
Quantifying and Projecting Emissions
 At every stage—understanding energy and emissions patterns, identifying opportunities 
for improvement, setting goals and policies, and monitoring implementation—reliable data 
is critical. Working together, the United states and China can strengthen their respective 
capacities to collect energy data, inventory greenhouse gas emissions, and project future 
emissions trajectories. such efforts can also contribute to the measurement, reporting, and 
verification of actions taken as part of a post-2012 climate agreement.60 
 For any government, the cornerstone of an effective climate mitigation strategy is a 
full, accurate national inventory of emission sources and sinks. As required under the Un 
Framework Convention, the United states, like other developed countries, annually submits 
a detailed emissions inventory subject to international review. in developing countries, due 
to resource constraints that limit the availability and quality of emissions data, inventories 
are notoriously inexact.61 As a result, Un requirements for developing countries are more 
flexible. The inventory reported in China’s only national communication to the UnFCCC 
thus far, in 2000, was based on 1994 data. China is now working with the developers of 
the Greenhouse Gas protocol, a widely used greenhouse gas accounting tool, to customize 
it for use in its most emissions-intensive industries.62 
 Beyond data on current emissions, sound policymaking also requires the ability to 
reliably project future emissions. The very wide fluctuations apparent in recent projections 
of future Chinese emissions underscore the difficulty of generating reliable forecasts, 
particularly in developing economies. in 2004, the U.s. DOe’s eiA projected that annual 
Chinese carbon emissions would reach 6.5 billion metric tons in 2025. A year later, the 
eiA revised that figure upwards by 1.5 billion tons. it raised its projection by another 
billion tons the following year, and again the year after. From 2004 to 2007, the projected 
increase in Chinese emissions grew by 3.5 billion tons, the equivalent of the current 
emissions from Central and south America, the Middle east, and Africa combined.63 
near-term projections were just as inaccurate—as recently as 2004, the eiA predicted 
China’s annual emissions would surpass those of the United states sometime after 2030, 
and we now know that this likely happened in 2007 (a phenomenon even the 2006 study 
did not project). 
 inaccurate projections stem in part from the lack of an accurate inventory of current 
emissions. But another major factor in this case was a poor understanding of the key economic 
60 “Measurable,	reportable	and	verifiable”	is	the	language	used	in	the	Bali	Action	Plan	(2007)	to	describe	“nationally	ap-
propriate	mitigation	commitments	or	actions.”	http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf.
61 “Selected Nations’ Reports on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Varied in Their Adherence to Standards,” GAO-04-98, U.S. 
General	Accounting	Office,	December	2003,	http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0498.pdf;	David	G.	Streets	et	al.,	“Recent	
Reductions in China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Science, November 30, 2001, pp. 1835-1837; Subodh Sharma, 
Sumana Bhattacharya, and Amit Garg, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions From India: A Perspective,” Current Science, February 
10, 2006, http://www.ias.ac.in/currsci/feb102006/326.pdf. 
62 The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative, http://www.ghgprotocol.org.
63 EIA’s changes to projections of U.S. emissions in 2025 varied by a much smaller margin.
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drivers of China’s emissions. While there had been no significant shifts in China’s energy 
mix or energy efficiency, the structure of the Chinese economy had changed dramatically as 
heavy industry outpaced light industry and services.64 Better understanding of underlying 
economic dynamics, and their implications for energy use and emissions, would provide a 
stronger foundation for long-term planning, investment, and policymaking.
Recommendations
• Improve emissions measurement and monitoring. 
  In order to strengthen national capacity to accurately monitor and measure GHG 
emissions in key sectors and economy-wide, the United States and China should 
jointly develop measurement, reporting, and verification procedures on emissions to 
be implemented nationally. 
 The further development of programs and training in energy audits and benchmarking 
at the facility level in targeted energy-intensive industries will contribute to the accuracy of 
emissions inventories. in all data collection activities, information sharing between the two 
countries for the purposes of research analysis should be encouraged.65 
• Expand scenario analyses.
  In order to better understand their own and each other’s emissions trends, the 
United States and China should undertake joint research to forecast emissions and 
economic conditions under different scenarios and evaluate the costs and emission 
reduction potentials of alternative mitigation approaches. 
 Joint modeling exercises with leading academics and government energy technology 
specialists and economists from both countries should be expanded. efforts should be made 
to make domestic modeling exercises, including a full description of the key assumptions, 
available to international experts to better inform analysis.
• Promote training programs.
  A cooperative training program for the next generation of interdisciplinary energy 
and climate specialists in China and the United States should be promoted to develop 
technical expertise and promote mutual understanding. 
64 Daniel Rosen and Trevor Houser, “China Energy,” op.cit. 
65 In addition to the work of the World Resources Institute and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
with the GHG protocol in China, other examples of international efforts with China underway in the area of measure-
ment	and	verification	include	the	International	Energy	Agency’s	project	on	energy	statistics	and	indicators	with	the	China	
National Bureau of Statistics; a cement industry benchmarking project with the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 
the China Energy Research Institute, China Building Materials Academy, and China Cement Association; the European 
Union	Energy	Efficiency	Program	(EUEEP)	benchmarking	project	for	cement,	steel,	and	chemicals;	The	Asia	Pacific	
Partnership’s work with the Cement Task Force on data collection; the U.S. EPA country study program and non-annex I 
assistance; and California’s work in China on a pilot GHG registry modeled after the California Registry. 
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 programs could focus on energy analysis, modeling, quantification and projection, and 
technology characteristics in each country. Activities could include conferences, training 
programs, and student, faculty, and inter-governmental exchanges. 
Financing Low-Carbon Technologies
 Both the United states and China have the capacity to invest more heavily to develop 
and deploy technologies that reduce emissions and strengthen energy security. to achieve 
these goals, both governments must commit greater public resources and do so in ways that 
effectively leverage private investment in a clean energy future. This will require innovative 
finance mechanisms and the removal of barriers including concern over intellectual property 
rights (ipR). 
 ieA projects that between now and 2030 China will invest $2.7 trillion in its power 
sector (including generation, transmission, and distribution).66 Over that time, it is projected 
that developing countries as a whole will invest $160 billion a year in the power sector, and 
that “greening” that investment will require an additional $30 billion a year. Globally, the 
additional annual investment needed in 2030 to return greenhouse gas emissions to current 
levels is an estimated $200 billion.67 
 Currently, the vast majority of investment in the energy and other sectors relevant 
to climate change mitigation (86 percent) comes from the private sector. Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) funds make up less than one percent of investment 
globally.68 in generating the additional financial flows needed, the central challenge will be 
to mobilize modest amounts of public funds to best leverage much larger sums of private 
capital for investment in a low-carbon energy infrastructure. 
 There are several examples of financial mechanisms that use public finance from 
developed countries to support climate change mitigation in developing countries, many 
that specifically target leveraging private investments. Multilateral development bank funds, 
such as the newly created World Bank Climate investment Funds, the newly proposed Clean 
technology Fund (CtF), and the Global environment Facility trust Fund, rely on donor 
country pledges. A donor-supported fund like the CtF may become part of a post-2012 
climate agreement that includes funding commitments from developed countries. Other 
models of public financing do not rely on existing national budgets, and therefore may be 
more flexible. These include funds raised from the auctioning of emission allowances in a 
domestic GhG cap-and-trade program and climate bonds issued by the government to pay 
for mitigation efforts at preferential credit ratings.69 
 Greater public investment will succeed in unleashing stronger private flows only 
with other improvements in the investment environment. in discussions with China, the 
66 “World Energy Outlook,” IEA, 2007, op.cit. 
67 “Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change,” UNFCCC, October 2007, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
publications/financial_flows.pdf.		
68 “Finance and Investment Flows to Address Climate Change,” UNFCCC, October 2007. 
69 Richard Doornbosch and Eric Knight, “What Role for Public Finance in International Climate Change Mitigation?”, 
OECD Roundtable on Sustainable Development, discussion paper, October 2008.
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United states and the eU have emphasized the importance of removing tariff and non-
tariff barriers to the trade of environmental goods and services so that broader trade in 
these technologies can occur unimpeded. Another area of concern is the management of 
ipR. Although China’s legal framework and enforcement capacity are still being developed, 
thousands of U.s. firms have successfully navigated ipR challenges in China. in the energy 
area, China has adopted innovative policies that have helped to promote the transfer of 
commercially-available low-carbon technologies through the licensing of ipR by foreign 
companies to Chinese companies.
 One key to stronger investment is developing new models for licensing low-carbon 
technologies that can make them broadly available while protecting commercial interests.70 
While compulsory licensing models such as those used to make crucial drugs more 
affordable to developing countries may not be appropriate for commercially-available energy 
technologies, particularly if incentives for future innovation are reduced, other models of 
licensing can be used to protect the transferor. For example, licensing agreements can 
include geographical restrictions in order to protect the transferring company in its home 
market. Alternatively, governments can aid in the procurement of commercial licenses by 
facilitating market access to the transferring company. The United states and China could 
pioneer such approaches, while advancing multilateral solutions through bilateral initiatives 
targeted to key technology needs.71 A stronger bilateral partnership would also benefit the 
world by delivering commercial possibilities in low-carbon technologies at an accelerated 
speed and unprecedented scale. 
 These types of financing and technology development mechanisms could be 
implemented under the umbrella of a “low-carbon” special economic Zone (seZ) in 
China. China’s existing seZ’s have special economic incentives tied to the investment 
goals of a particular zone, for example encouraging foreign investment through tax and 
trade tariff concessions. They are widely credited with creating jobs, advancing technical 
knowledge, and contributing to economic growth. Additional zones could be established 
with incentives for low-carbon industries, as well as highly efficient models of energy 
production and consumption, and of environmental regulation and enforcement, with the 
hope that these zones could become testing grounds for a larger-scale model of low-carbon 
economic development.72 pilot low-carbon economic zones are being explored under the 
current bilateral cooperation agreement between China and the european Union on energy 
70 See e.g., Jerome Reichman and Keith Maskus, eds., “International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a 
Globalized Intellectual Property Regime,” Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK, 2005;  Mark Levine, testimony 
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Energy Policies and Their Environ-
mental Impacts, August 13, 2008.
71 This is a different challenge from the one faced by other developing countries that do not possess the indigenous technical 
capacities of China or India but will still need access to these technologies to reduce their emissions. See, for example, Mark  
Levine testimony, 2008, op.cit; Joanna Lewis, “Technology Acquisition and Innovation in the Developing World: Wind Turbine 
Development in China and India,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 42, issue 3, December 2007.
72 Hu Angang, “Strengthening Sino-European Cooperation,” March 26, 2008, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/
show/single/en/1836-Strengthening-Sino-European-cooperation; “Changing Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and 
Climate Security for China and Europe,” Chatham House and E3G, November, 2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/
files/10845_1107climate.pdf.
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and climate change. several existing seZs in China are already attracting low-carbon 
investments such as tianjin, the port city east of Beijing, which is home to several leading 
global wind turbine and solar photovoltaic manufacturing companies.
 While short-term improvements in greenhouse gas mitigation can be best achieved 
through the deployment of available technologies, there is still strong rationale to support 
the development of future technologies through joint research efforts that can result in 
shared intellectual property. At the pre-commercial stage, technologies require sustained 
public financial support, and can benefit from the combined resources of many countries. 
There are multiple models for bilateral research and development, including through the 
international exchange of researchers to national research laboratories, or through the 
establishment of a joint research laboratory supported by both governments. 
Recommendations
• Promote targeted technology transfer. 
  The United States and China should identify key technologies within each country that 
could benefit from public support in facilitating commercial technology transfers. 
 innovative licensing arrangements that protect commercial interests should be pursued. 
Both countries should examine opportunities to promote expansion of ipR protection 
within national contexts and within models of commercially driven technology transfer, 
and implement policies to support this expansion. 
• Expand collaborative R&D. 
  The United States and China should jointly determine strategic areas for joint 
research and development of pre-commercial, low-carbon energy technologies that 
would contribute to the creation of jointly-held intellectual property rights. 
 The agreement to conduct joint R&D should include a pre-established model for sharing 
the intellectual property (including patents) and know-how resulting from the research.
• Streamline priority import and export technologies.
  China and the United States should jointly identify advanced energy technologies in 
their respective countries that should be prioritized for streamlined import or export. 
 incentives for improved trade flows in low-carbon and other essential technologies 
should be negotiated, building upon the discussions to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers on 
environmental goods and services. Governments should consider designing trade regulations 
to promote flows in low-carbon technologies, as well as providing additional support such as 
low cost loans from the export-import banks to improve access to the technologies. to facilitate 
these discussions, both countries should increase the resources and support for government 
outreach with green businesses and entrepreneurs in the United states and China. 
45
V. Getting Started
A new U.S.-China partnership on energy and climate must have sustained support at 
the highest levels of government if it is to deliver concrete action on the ground. it must 
provide for focused, ongoing engagement between the two leaderships, and must effectively 
enlist key players with a stake in creating a low-carbon future from government, the expert 
community, and the private sector.
 The first step in launching this new partnership should be a leaders summit early in the 
new U.s. administration’s term. The partnership should then be implemented through a 
two-tiered structure: a high-level governing council to provide ongoing direction; and a set 
of task forces focused on each of the priority areas identified in the previous section.
 Leaders Summit. The gravity and the urgency of the energy and climate challenges 
confronting the United states and China warrant a full-scale leaders summit with significant 
time devoted exclusively to a common clean energy agenda. holding this summit early in 
the administration would ensure that the two governments move as quickly as possible to 
begin addressing the critical climate change and energy security issues and would signal to 
the global community their commitment to seeking shared solutions. The outcome should 
include an agreement to establish a U.s.-China partnership on energy and Climate Change. 
This partnership should build upon existing bilateral cooperation, including the ten-Year 
energy and environment Cooperation Framework under the strategic economic Dialogue 
(seD). This would provide continuity with previous agreements between the United states 
and China, demonstrating the U.s. desire to ensure sustained, long-term cooperation. 
 to ensure sustained attention at the leadership level, energy and climate should be 
established as a standing agenda item for future U.s.-China summits. Leaders should 
regularly revisit these issues in the context of the bilateral relationship to better understand 
the challenges, monitor progress, and seek further opportunities to strengthen cooperation 
and provide joint leadership toward global solutions. 
 High-Level Council. With direction from leaders, the partnership should be managed 
on an ongoing basis by a governing council composed of the heads of environmental, 
energy, finance, and other relevant ministries and departments in both governments. 
U.s. representation on the council should include members of Congress, whose support is 
necessary to ensure adequate and sustained funding. Although aspects of energy and climate 
may be effectively addressed within the framework of the strategic economic Dialogue, 
primary responsibility for these issues should rest with a new governing council. 
 The council should meet periodically each year, initially to establish strategic direction 
and priorities for the partnership, and later to review progress, reassess priorities, and 
identify new needs and challenges. in addition to directing collaborative efforts, the council 
should serve as a forum for U.s.-China dialogue on other energy- and climate-related 
issues, including those arising in other international fora such as the ongoing multilateral 
negotiations under the Un Framework Convention.
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 Task Forces. in each of the priority areas described above, a bilateral task Force 
should be created to set goals and timelines, develop a program of activities, and oversee 
implementation. The working groups should be composed of senior officials of relevant 
ministries and departments, independent experts, representatives of business and financial 
communities and non-governmental organizations, with decision-making responsibility 
resting with the government participants. it is especially critical that the task Forces seek 
out business engagement and expertise and encourage direct private sector involvement in 
collaborative efforts. 
 Working within the direction provided, and within available resources, each working 
group should develop a detailed implementation plan for approval by the governing council. 
in developing their plans, the working groups should seek broad input from experts within 




The challenge of global climate change is unprecedented in world history. The fact that 
a molecule of carbon dioxide emitted in the United states is just as harmful to Chinese 
as one emitted in China is to Americans—or, indeed, to anyone on our planet—means 
that no human being is exempt from our inescapable commons. This new reality begs a 
completely new set of global responses. One of the most critical responses must come from 
the United states and China. For without the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases in 
the world forging a new and extensive collaborative relationship, this global problem will 
remain intractable and unsolvable.
 Whatever our other disagreements may be, failure of the United states and China to 
cooperate successfully on this unique issue will jeopardize any hope the world community as 
a whole may have of heading off ever more dire impacts from a changing global climate. 
 While a sino-U.s. bilateral effort is a critical element in any overall global climate 
strategy, it is not an alternative to the multilateral Un climate change process. Collaboration 
between the United states and China will be crucial both to achieving significant greenhouse 
gas reductions in both countries, and to creating the joint momentum that will inevitably 
be required for a larger multilateral solution to this collective challenge.
 The time is late and the task daunting, but there are some trends and signs that 
nonetheless give cause for new hope, if not outright optimism. 
 China’s leadership has shown a growing awareness of the concrete threats that global 
warming poses to China and the world. With new government policy pronouncements and 
bureaucratic restructuring to focus on climate change as well as regular public discussion 
of the issue, there is reason to be optimistic that China is in the process of becoming a 
more receptive partner with the United states and others to take increasingly concrete and 
meaningful climate change remedies.
 in Washington, the new administration of president-elect Barack Obama also portends 
a sea change in both awareness of the seriousness of this threat and a commensurate change 
in government policy. And while the recent global financial crisis will mean even greater 
competition for government resources, the various economic recovery packages now 
being adopted in both capitals may well provide opportunities for funds to scale clean 
techindustries that will be the engines of the next technological revolution, as well as the 
generators of new jobs. 
 Moreover, while at first blush the faltering global economy may seem to present 
an inhospitable environment in which to confront such a massive and costly challenge, 
historically it has been precisely during such times of stress and crisis that rigid structures 
and systems that have outlived their usefulness have often become malleable and susceptible 
to change or replacement. This change will, of course, take wise leadership. if such leadership 
is forthcoming, however, there will be an incomparable opportunity not only to reformat 
the energy systems of both countries, but also to gain a new and welcomed measure of 
energy security. 
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 if over the next year the U.s. and Chinese leaderships are, in fact, capable of forging 
a new and effective alliance, not only will they succeed in taking a giant step forward for 
the world as a whole on the question of climate change, but they will also afford Americans 
and Chinese a second incomparable benefit: a new, more collaborative, and stable basis for 
interaction in their countries’ relations, which is now commonly acknowledged to be the 
most important bilateral relationship in the world. 
 That our planet is now on the precipice of a point of no return seems increasingly self-
evident. And while it is true that recognition of the perils implicit at such moments can be 
unsettling, it is also true that with bold leadership, such moments can also be galvanizing. 
it is as yet unclear whether growing awareness of this tipping point moment will converge 
with new leadership in Washington and an increasingly well-informed central leadership 
in China to catalyze both countries toward the requisite clarity of vision, mustering of 
intellectual resources, and appropriation of funds, technology, and international cooperation 
to remedy the challenge of climate change. But what is clear is that we are in uncharted 
waters. The moment now upon us begs an unprecedented effort from both the world at 
large and, in particular, from the United states and China, the most important players in 
this “game.” if the United states and China can find ways to bridge the divide, the benefits 
will not be limited to helping solve the climate change challenge alone. 
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DOe and sstC
sstC and China’s national 
Climate Committee
Purpose
Facilitate the development of commercial relations 
and related economic matters between the United 
states and China. The JCCt’s environment  
subgroup supports technology demonstrations, 
training workshops, trade missions, exhibitions, 
and conferences to foster environmental and  
commercial cooperation.
For U.s. companies to promote their electric power 
technology services in China. industry representa-
tives identified a potential for $13.5 billion in U.s. 
electric power exports between 1994-2003 (not 
including nuclear power), equating to 270,000 
high-salary U.s. jobs and an opportunity for intro-
ducing cost-effective, environmentally sound U.s. 
technologies into China’s electric power industry.
The first non-governmental, non-profit organiza-
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government agencies, supporting energy efficiency 
business development, creating and coordinating 
technical training programs, and providing  
information to energy professionals. 
1) to make positive contributions toward improv-
ing process and equipment efficiency, reduce  
atmospheric pollution on a global scale, advance 
China’s Clean Coal technologies Development 
program, and promote economic and trade  
cooperation beneficial to both parties.
2) Cooperation in coal-fired magnetohydrody-
namic (MhD) power generation.
Lay out China’s request for international assis-
tance. The United states agreed to support China 
through DOe’s Climate Change Country studies 
and support for national Action plans programs.
Bilateral agreements on energy between DOe and ministries as noted below: 
1) MOU on bilateral energy consultations (with spC)
2) Research on Reactor Fuel (with CAeA)
3) Renewable energy (with Ministry of Agriculture)
4) energy efficiency Development (with sstC)
5) Renewable energy technology Development (with sstC)
6) Coal Bed Methane Recovery and Use (with MOCi)
7) Regional Climate Research (with the CMA)
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-plan for mapping China’s renewable energy resources (DOe and spC)
-strategies for facilitating financing of U.s. renewable energy projects in  
China (with DOe, spC, Chinese and U.s. ex-im banks)
-Discussions for reducing and phasing out lead in gasoline in China (DOe, 
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tulane University, with 
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DOe and spC
U.s. secretary of Defense 
and Vice-Chairman of 
Chinese Central Military 
Commission
Purpose
This protocol has seven annexes: policy, rural 
energy (Ministry of Agriculture), large-scale wind 
systems (with MOep), hybrid village power, 
renewable energy business development (with 
setC), and geothermal energy, energy efficiency 
(with spC), hybrid-electric vehicle development.
energy efficiency includes 10 teams of Chinese 
and U.s. government and industry representatives 
focusing on: energy policy, information exchange 
and business outreach, district heating, cogenera-
tion, buildings, motor systems, industrial process 
controls, lighting, amorphous core transformers, 
finance.
Five meetings to discuss energy supply and  
demand and exchange information on methods  
of datacollection and processing of energy infor-
mation.
Venue for high-level bilateral discussion on sus-
tainable development. established 4 working 
groups: energy policy, commercial cooperation, 
science for sustainable development, environmen-
tal policy. Three priority areas for cooperative 
work: urban air quality, rural electrification,  
clean energy and energy efficiency.
targeting urban air quality, rural electrification, 
and energy sources, and clean energy sources and 
energy efficiency. involved multiple agencies, par-
ticipatants from business sectors, and link energy 
development and environmental protection.
An initiative centered at tsinghua and tulane 
Universities co-funded by DOe and MOst to 
1) provide training programs in environmental 
policies, legislation and technology, 2) develop 
markets for U.s. clean coal technologies, and 3) 
help minimize the local, regional, and global envi-
ronmental impact of China’s energy consumption.
paved the way for the exchange of information 
and personnel, training, and participation in  
research and development in the field of nuclear 
and nuclear non-proliferation technologies.
MOU provides for the exchange of visits by  
high-level defense officials and the opening of  
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Cooperation Working 
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U.s., China + india, Japan, 
Korea, Australia (later 
Canada)
Vice premier Wu Yi and 
U.s. treasury secretary 
henry paulson. includes 
DOe, epA, nDRC, MOst
UsDA and nDRC
Purpose
plasma physics, fusion technology, advanced  
design studies, and materials research. 
plasma physics, fusion technology, and power 
plant studies.
includes 13 countries, including China.
initially an iGCC plus CCs plant, restructured 
in January 2008 as potential federal funding to 
support CCs on a privately funded iGCC or pC 
plant. Companies can bid for participation and 
funding.
Resumed the former energy policy Consultations 
under the 1995 DOe-spC MOU. Led to a  
MOU between DOe and nDRC on industrial 
energy efficiency Cooperation and includes 
energy audits of up to 12 of China’s most energy-
intensive enterprises, as well as training and site 
visits in the United states to train auditors.
included opportunities for DOe to assist China 
with physical protection of nuclear and  
radiological materials and facilities for the  
Beijing Olympics as they had done in Athens.
Created public-private task forces around specific 
sectors; Aluminum, Buildings and Appliances, 
Cement, Cleaner Use of Fossil energy, Coal  
Mining power Generation and transmission, 
Renewable energy and Distributed Generation, 
steel.
Bi-annual, cabinet-level dialogue that includes  
an energy and environment track.
encourages cooperation in biomass and feedstock 
production and sustainability; conversion  
technology and engineering; bio-based product 
development and utilization standards; and rural 
and agricultural development strategies.
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ment of Energy Cooperation with the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DOE, April 2006; Katharine A. Fredriksen, Acting 
Assistant	Secretary,	Office	of	Policy	and	International	Affairs,	U.S.	DOE,	Statement	before	the	U.S.-China	Economic	and	







U.s.-China Bilateral  
Civil nuclear energy 
Cooperative Action plan
U.s.-China Westinghouse 
nuclear Reactor  
Agreement







DOe, state nuclear power 
technology Corporation 
(snptC)
DOe, treasury, state 
Commerce, epA, nDRC, 
sFA, neA, MOF, MOep, 
MOst, and MFA
Purpose
to complement discussions under the Global 
nuclear energy partnership (GnDp) toward 
the expansion of peaceful, proliferation-resistant 
nuclear energy for greenhouse gas emissions-free, 
sustainable electricity production. Bilateral  
discussions include separations technology,  
fuels and materials development, fast reactor  
technology, and safeguards planning.
DOe approved the sale of 4 x 1,100-megawatt 
Ap-1000 nuclear power plants that use a recently 
improved version of existing Westinghouse pres-
surized water reactor technology. The contract 
was valued at $8 billion and included technology 
transfer to China. The four reactors are to be built 
between 2009 and 2015. 
establishes five joint task forces on the five func-
tional areas of the framework: 1) clean efficiency 
and secure electricity production and transmission 
2) clean water 3) clean air 4) clean and efficient 




BECon Beijing energy efficiency Center 
CAEA China Atomic energy Authority
CAS Chinese Academy of sciences
CCS carbon capture and storage 
CMA Chinese Meteorological Administration 
CSIRO Commonwealth scientific and industrial Research Organization 
CSP concentrated solar thermal power technology 
CTF Clean technology Fund
DOC U.s. Department of Commerce 
DOE U.s. Department of energy 
DOS U.s. Department of state
DOT U.s. Department of transportation
EESA emergency economic stabilization Act 
EIA energy information Administration, U.s. Department of energy
EOR enhanced oil recovery 
EPA U.s. environmental protection Agency
ERI China energy Research institute
GNEP Global nuclear energy partnership 
IEA international energy Agency
IGCC integrated gasification combined cycle
IPCC intergovernmental panel on Climate Change 
IPR intellectual property rights 
JCCT U.s.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and trade 
LBNL Lawrence Berkeley national Laboratory
MCI China Ministry of Coal industry 
MFA China Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHD magnethydrodynamic 
MOA China Ministry of Agriculture
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MOEP  China Ministry of environmental protection (formerly state environmental 
protection Administration sepA)
MOF China Ministry of Finance 
MOST China Ministry of science and technology
MOU memorandum of understanding
NDRC China national Development and Reform Commission
NEA China national energy Administration
NOAA U.s. national Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NZEC near Zero emission Coal 
OGIF U.s.-China Oil and Gas industry Forum
PC pulverized Coal
PHEV plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 
PNNL pacific northwest national Laboratory
PTC production tax Credit 
PUNT peaceful Uses of nuclear technology 
RPS Renewable portfolio standards 
SDPC China state Development planning Commission
SED strategic economic Dialogue 
SETC China state economic and trade Commission
SEZ special economic Zone 
SFA China state Forestry Administration
SINOPEC China petroleum and Chemical Corporation
SNPTC state nuclear power technology Corporation
SPC China state planning Commission
SSC superconducting super Collider 
SSTC China state science technology Commission
UNFCCC United nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USDA U.s. Department of Agriculture
WWF World Wildlife Fund
WWFN World Wide Financial network

